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ABSTRACT
The question has arisen in numerous cases as to the extent to which a settlement
between arms’ length parties is dispositive in tax cases of the claims on which the
settlement is based. Another issue that often arises is whether the receipt of
compensation for a tax payment that was incurred because of the negligence of the
payor is excluded from gross income. While those two issues were central to the
proper resolution of a recent case in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, McKenny v. United States, the court failed even to note one of
those issues and did not resolve the other. The court’s failure to deal with those two
issues led it to reach an incorrect result.
The two landmark cases establishing the doctrines that should have been applied in
McKenny are the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyeth v, Hoey and the decision of
the Board of Tax Appeals (now known as the Tax Court) in Clark v. Commissioner.
Using McKenny as a springboard, this article reviews the continued misapplication
and sometimes disparagement of the Lyeth v. Hoey and Clark v. Commissioner
reasonings. Clark, in particular, has been criticized by both academics and the
Service. The article reviews those criticisms and argues that they are unpersuasive.
The article concludes that both doctrines are valid and should have applied to find
for the taxpayer in the McKenny case.
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I.

INTRODUCTION AND THE MCKENNEY CASE

The question has arisen in numerous cases as to the extent to which a
settlement between arms’ length parties is dispositive in tax cases of the claims on
which the settlement is based. Another issue that often arises is whether the receipt
of compensation for a tax payment that was incurred because of the negligence of
the payor is excluded from gross income. Those two issues were central to the
proper resolution of a recent case in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, but the court failed even to note one of those issues and did not
resolve the other. The case in question is McKenny v. United States, 1 and the
court’s failure to deal with those issues led it to reach a totally incorrect result. The
McKenny decision is worthy of discussion as a vehicle for examining the scope and
application of the doctrines that should have controlled the result in that case. The
two landmark cases establishing the doctrines that should have been applied in
McKenny are the Supreme Court’s decision in Lyeth v, Hoey 2 and the decision of
the Board of Tax Appeals (now known as the Tax Court) in Clark v.
Commissioner. 3 The Eleventh Circuit failed to even mention Lyeth v. Hoey or the
doctrine it established. While the court did note the Clark case, because the court
determined that the taxpayer had failed to establish that he would have paid less tax
if the payor had not been negligent, it expressly declined to pass upon whether the
principle established in Clark is valid and whether it should have been applied to
the taxpayer’s recovery.
The relevant facts of McKenny are as follows. The taxpayer 4 operated a
consulting business as a sole proprietor. On advice of his accountant, an S
corporation was formed with the sole shareholder being an ESOP, and the sole
beneficiary of the ESOP was the taxpayer. The taxpayer’s consulting business was
taken over by the S corporation, and the taxpayer was the sole employee of the
corporation. The goal of this arrangement was to defer the recognition of income
--- F3d ----, 2020 WL 5167333 (11th Cir. 2020).
305 U.S. 188 (1938).
3
40 B.T.A. 333 (1939), Acq,
4
The taxpayer’s wife was included as a party to the case because she and the taxpayer filed a joint
return. Throughout this article, we refer only to the husband as the taxpayer even though the wife
was also a taxpayer as a result of filing a joint return with the husband.
1
2
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by having the income from the consulting business pass through to the ESOP as the
shareholder of the S corporation so that the income would not be taxable until
dispersed from the ESOP at some future date. 5 The accountant created the S
corporation and the ESOP. The business was conducted in that fashion from 2000
to 2005, and the taxpayer reported little taxable income in those years. Pursuant to
an audit in 2005, the IRS determined that the manner in which the entities were
established did not qualify the arrangement for tax deferral and that the taxpayer’s
taxable income in those years that was derived from the consulting business was
greatly underreported. 6 As a result of an amendment to the Code, for years after
2004, the S Corp/ESOP arrangement on which the consulting business was being
conducted was expressly prevented from obtaining the tax deferral benefits that the
taxpayer hoped to have. Consequently, even if the arrangement had been carried
out properly, there would have been no tax benefits for the income earned in the
year 2005; but the benefits likely could have been obtained for the income in the
years 2000-2004 if all of the required conditions had been satisfied.
In 2007, the taxpayer settled his tax issues with the IRS. Under the written
settlement agreement, the taxpayers conceded that they were not entitled to any of
the tax benefits they had claimed for the ESOP arrangement and paid over
$2,000,000 in tax liability including interest and penalties.
In 2008, the taxpayer filed suit against the accountant for malpractice.
Taxpayer claimed that the accountant made numerous errors in establishing the
ESOP that prevented the arrangement from successfully deferring the income, and
those errors caused the taxpayers to incur greater tax liability than he would have
incurred if the accountant had conducted the arrangement properly. In 2009, the
parties settled the lawsuit. The settlement required the accountant to pay taxpayer
$800,000, which was substantially less than the amount of damage claimed by the
taxpayer. 7 The taxpayer incurred legal fees of $419,400 in the pursuit of this
litigation and settlement.
The taxpayer excluded the $800,000 settlement proceeds from his gross
income on the ground that it was a return of capital. The taxpayer claimed a business
expense deduction under § 162 for the $419,400 of legal fees. The taxpayer also
claimed a loss deduction for the excess of amounts he paid to the IRS over the
$800,000 settlement he received from the accountant. The IRS determined that the
$800,000 settlement was included in taxpayer’s gross income, and it denied the
claim for a loss deduction for the excess of the taxes paid over the $800,000
settlement. The IRS determined that the legal fees paid in connection with the
litigation were not business expenses but rather were miscellaneous itemized
§§ 401(a), 501(a), and 402(a).
The audit also denied the taxpayer’s treatment of income from a car dealership that was held by
the taxpayer in a similar arrangement. For purposes of this article, we need not discuss that issue.
7
In the settlement agreement, the accountant maintained that it was not negligent. Nevertheless, the
accountant agreed to pay $800,000 to the taxpayer on his claim.
5
6
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deductions. 8 The taxpayer contested those determinations and filed suit for a refund
in a United States District Court. In the district court, both the taxpayer and the
government filed motions for Summary Judgement.
The result of the cross motions in the district court were mixed. The district
court held that the $800,000 settlement the taxpayer received from the accountant
was excluded from his income. The court held that the legal fees paid to litigate
with the accountant were not business expenses 9, and also denied the claim for a
loss deduction for the unreimbursed excess amount paid to the IRS. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
The decision of the court of appeals was a complete victory for the
government. The court upheld the district court’s denial of a deduction for the
difference between the excess amount of taxes paid to the IRS and the $800,000
settlement on the ground that that issue was foreclosed by the written settlement
agreement that the taxpayer and the IRS had executed concerning the arrangement.
The court held that the legal fees incurred in litigating with the accountant were not
business expenses but were deductible, subject to the 2% of adjusted gross income
floor, as a miscellaneous itemized deduction. 10 Most importantly to the focus of
this article, the court held that the $800,000 settlement was included in the
taxpayer’s gross income and so reversed the district court on that issue.
For the taxpayer in McKenney to prevail on his claim that the $800,000
settlement is excluded from income, he must first establish that: (1) the accountant
was negligent, (2) the S Corp/ESOP arrangement would have reduced that
taxpayer’s tax liability if the arrangement had been handled properly, and the
accountant’s negligent handling of the arrangement caused the taxpayer to pay a
larger amount of tax, and (3) the amount of larger tax payment incurred from the
accountant’s negligence was no less than $800,000. As to the latter requirement,
the amount of overpayment could not include the tax payment made for income
earned in 2005 since the amendment to the Code prevented the arrangement from
Since the IRS determined that the $800,000 recovery was included in taxpayer’s income, the legal
fees would be expenses incurred for the production of income and would be deductible as a
miscellaneous itemized deduction under §212(1). The taxpayer’s total amount of miscellaneous
itemized deduction is deductible only to the extent that the total exceeds 2% of the taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income. § 67(a). Note that under the District Court’s determination that the $800,000
settlement is excluded from gross income, the legal fees would not be incurred for the production
of income and so would not be deductible at all. Note also, that in 2017, the Code was amended to
deny any deduction for miscellaneous itemized deductions incurred in the years 2018-2025. § 67(g).
9
Since the court held that the settlement the taxpayer received was excluded from income, the legal
fees were not incurred to produce income and so were not deductible at all.
10
Since the court held that the $800,000 settlement was included in taxpayer’s gross income, the
legal fees were deductible under § 212(1) as expenses incurred to produce income. Since the years
involved were prior to 2018, the taxpayer’s miscellaneous itemized deductions were deductible
subject to the 2% of adjusted gross income floor. If the court had not erred in determining that the
$800,000 settlement was included in taxpayer’s income, the legal fees would not be deductible at
all since they would not have been incurred to produce income.
8
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applying to the income earned in that year. In deciding McKenney, the court of
appeals held that the taxpayer failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet his
burden to prove that the arrangement would have succeeded if done correctly, and
failed to prove what the amount of tax reduction taxpayer would have obtained
from that arrangement. In reaching that decision, the court did not mention the
doctrine established by Lyeth v Hoey 11 and failed to consider whether that doctrine
satisfied the taxpayer’s burden of proof. As discussed below in Part II, the authors
contend that the doctrine of Lyeth v. Hoey is applicable to the facts of McKenney
and does establish that the requirements described above were satisfied. Even if
those requirements were satisfied, the taxpayer could not exclude the recovery from
income unless the doctrine established in Clark v. Commissioner 12 is valid and is
applicable to the facts of the McKenney case. We discuss the applicability of the
Clark doctrine in Part III of this article.
II.

LYETH V. HOEY

In Lyeth v. Hoey, 13 the taxpayer was one of the grandchildren of a decedent
and was one of the heirs to her estate if she had died intestate. The decedent,
however, had made a will leaving small bequests to her heirs, and leaving the bulk
of her estate (over $3,000,000) to a trust to preserve the records of Mary Baker
Eddy. In the probate of the decedent’s estate, the grandchildren contested the will
claiming that it was invalid because the testatrix lacked testamentary capacity and
because of undue influence. The issue was set for trial; but before the trial took
place, the parties settled the dispute dividing the estate among the heirs and the
trust.
As one of the heirs, the taxpayer received a share of the estate under the
settlement. The government contended that the amount received by the taxpayer
was included in his gross income and was taxable. The taxpayer contended that the
amount he received was an inheritance attributable to his status as an heir and so
was excluded from income. 14
The question of whether a settlement can override the terms of a will had
arisen in a number of states primarily in cases involving inheritance tax laws. The
state court decisions on that question were divided. Massachusetts, which was the
state whose law applied, had held that a settlement did not override a will. The
Supreme Court held that state law did not apply in determining whether the
decedent’s property passed to the taxpayer by inheritance. Instead, federal law
controlled. The Court determined that under federal law, the settlement controlled.
Since the basis of the taxpayer’s claim for a share of the estate depended upon the
claim that the will was invalid, the settlement was treated as resolving that question,
305 U.S. 188 (1938).
40 BTA 333 (1939), Acq.
13
305 U.S. 188.
14
§ 102(a).
11
12
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and the property that the taxpayer received was treated as inherited from an intestate
decedent. The Court did hold that the question of who was an heir who would
inherit if the decedent died intestate was determined by Massachusetts state law. In
the Lyeth v. Hoey case, there was no dispute that the taxpayer was an heir under
state law. The Court noted that if the issue had been litigated and the result reached
by the judgment of a court, the court’s decision would be controlling; 15 and the
Supreme Court said that there was no reason to treat a settlement differently.
The Lyeth v. Hoey decision has been cited in a vast number of cases and
rulings, and the holding of the case has been followed and explained in many cases.
A requirement for the application of the rule is that the claim on which the
settlement was made was bona fide, in good faith and has a color of merit. The
settlement will not be controlling if it is merely a disguised means of instigating
another transaction such as a gift or a sale or exchange. For example, if Mary died
and left all of her estate to her two daughters and nothing to her son, and if her two
daughters wanted their brother to have some part of the estate, they might have the
son make a claim that the will was invalid even though there were no reasonable
grounds for that claim and then settle with the estate for a portion thereof. The
actual substance of the purported settlement would be a disguised gift from the
daughters to their brother; and the transaction should be so characterized by the tax
law. But, if a claim is bona fide and made in good faith and is not frivolous, a
settlement will control regardless of the likelihood of its success in litigation.
In Rev. Rul. 66-139, 16 a decedent left his widow an interest in his estate that
did not qualify for a marital deduction. The value of that interest was less than the
widow would receive if she elected to take against the will and receive the
commuted value of her dower interest. The widow did elect against the will, and
the Executor denied her claim on the basis of an antenuptial agreement that the
decedent and the widow had executed. The widow claimed that the antenuptial
agreement was invalid. The widow and the Executor settled the dispute under
which the widow received a dollar amount that was greater than the value of the
interest bequeathed to her in the will but less than the value of her dower interest.
The Commissioner held that the compromise in the settlement is to be treated the
same as if the widow’s election were effective and so qualified for the marital
deduction.

Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967) changed the weight to be given state court
decisions in tax cases other than the decisions of a state supreme court. State lower court decisions
are respected but are not necessarily conclusive. Cases and rulings subsequent to Bosch have
continued to give conclusive effect to settlement agreements. See e.g., Early v. Commissioner, 445
F2d 166 (5th Cir. 1971); Howard v. Commissioner, n. 17, infra; Shook v. United States, 713 F2d 662
(11th Cir. 1983); and Rev. Rul. 76-199, 1976-1 Cum. Bull. 288.
16
1966-1 CB 225.
15
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The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Howard v. Commissioner 17 illustrates the scope and operation of the Lyeth v. Hoey
rule. In that case, the taxpayer (Lucille) had been married to a man who was serving
in the Army. They separated, and the husband subsequently sought to divorce her.
Claiming falsely that he could not locate her, the husband sent a notice of the action
for divorce to the wife at her birthplace. The taxpayer never received notice of the
divorce proceeding. A court granted the divorce without the wife’s appearance.
The wife knew nothing about the case until she received a form from the Army
notifying her that she would no longer receive support payments because there had
been a divorce. She assumed that there had been a valid divorce or the Army would
not have discontinued her support payments. Many years later, the husband wanted
to sell real estate that he owned and entered into negotiations for a sale of the
property. The buyer’s lawyer looked into the prior divorce proceeding and
determined that there was a strong possibility that the divorce decree was invalid
because of the husband’s fraudulent representations. If so, the wife would have
dower rights. The buyer would not purchase the property unless the taxpayer signed
the transfer of the deed to waive her dower rights. The husband needed to sell the
property to avoid a foreclosure on it. The husband contacted the wife and asked her
to sign the deed of transfer. The taxpayer agreed to sign and waive her dower rights
but only if the husband paid her $40,000 in exchange for her dower rights in the
property. The husband agreed, and taxpayer received the $40,000. A payment in
exchange for the release of a dower interest is not included in the income of the
recipient. 18 The taxpayer excluded the $40,000 from her income on the ground that
it was a payment for her release of her dower rights. The IRS contended that the
payment was includible in her gross income.
The Tax Court upheld the IRS and held that the payment was income to
taxpayer on two grounds. One reason was that the court determined that there was
no fraud in the divorce proceeding and that the wife had waited too long to contend
that the divorce was invalid and so laches would apply. The second reason was that
Lyeth v. Hoey did not apply because there was no threat of litigation and so no
actual settlement. The Fifth Circuit reversed and held that the doctrine of Lyeth v.
Hoey did apply and that the $40,000 payment was properly excluded from
taxpayer’s income.
For the payment taxpayer received to be excluded, the court would have to
find that the divorce was invalid so that taxpayer possessed dower rights and that
the payment was made in exchange for those dower rights. In determining that the
Lyeth v. Hoey doctrine conclusively resolved those issues in favor of the taxpayer,
the following statements from the court’s opinion are informative:
447 F2d 152 (5th Cir. 1971).
See United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1972); Dotson v. United States, 87 F3d 682 (5th Cir.
1996); Rev. Rul. 79-132, 1979-2 Cum. Bull. 29.
17
18
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The Tax Court and the Commissioner on appeal find Lyeth
inapplicable because the taxpayers’ standing as heirs was not
challenged while here petitioner’s status as wife has been contested.
With deference, we think that such reasoning misses the point of
Lyeth. In Lyeth the Court established the doctrine that in tax matters
the characterization of proceeds received should be determined
according to the nature of the claims in settlement of which the
proceeds were received. It is artificial to say that any particular
aspect of the claim (i.e., status) must be conceded. ….
We conclude that the case is controlled by Lyeth v. Hoey
and its progeny. The question that determines whether the proceeds
received by Lucille are to be treated for tax purposes as property
received for release of dower rights is not whether in fact Florida
would recognize dower rights but whether there was a good faith
compromise concerning her claim to dower rights. 19
The court further said “Moreover, we are of the view that the tax character
of the proceeds received under a claim should not necessarily be determined by the
strength or merits of the party’s claim. Rather, it should be determined on the basis
of the party’s good faith belief as to the merits.” 20 For example, while the court
expressly said that it could not determine whether a court would bar the taxpayer’s
claim for laches, it does not matter so long as the claim was brought by the taxpayer
in good faith.
Concord Instruments Corp. v. Commissioner 21 provides another example of
the conclusive treatment given to settlements. Taxpayer had lost a tax case against
the government and chose to appeal the decision. Taxpayer’s lawyer erred in failing
to file an appeal on time, and so no appeal could be taken. Taxpayer sued the lawyer
for malpractice for the damage it suffered in paying taxes to the IRS and paying
interest to the IRS and to a bank. The suit was settled, and taxpayer received
$125,000. The government contended that the settlement was income to the
taxpayer, and the taxpayer sued the Commsisioner in the Tax Court. The Tax Court
acknowledged that one could only speculate as to whether taxpayer would have
prevailed on an appeal, but the court treated that issue as settled by the settlement.
The court excluded that amount of the settlement that was paid for the tax paid to
the IRS. That portion of the settlement that was paid for the interest expenses
taxpayer incurred was included in its income under the tax benefit rule since
taxpayer had deducted those payments.
Consider how the Lyeth v. Hoey doctrine applies to the McKenney case. The
taxpayer’s claim was substantial and certainly had color of merit. The taxpayer and
Howard, 447 F2d 152, 155-56.
Id. at 157.
21
TC Memo 1994-228 (1994).
19
20
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the accountant were dealing with each other at arms’ length. The accountant had no
reason to pay taxpayer $800,000 if it did not consider the claim to have merit. Theirs
was not a relationship in which the payment might have been a gift or a disguised
compensation for services or property. As to the question of whether the accountant
was negligent and whether that negligence caused the taxpayer to incur a larger tax
liability than would have applied if the arrangement had been done properly, the
settlement had to have been based on the acknowledgement that a court might find
for the taxpayer on those issues. As noted in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Howard,
it does not matter how strong the merits of the taxpayer’s case may be; what matters
is whether the taxpayer brought the claim in good faith and it was not frivolous. As
to the question of what was the amount of additional tax liability the taxpayer
incurred as a result of the negligence, the accountant agreed that it was at least
$800,000 or he wouldn’t have settled for that amount. The settlement conclusively
establishes an excess payment of at least $800,000, and so that amount should have
been excluded from taxpayer’s income. The amount paid is too large to have been
a nuisance settlement, but even if it were, the Lyeth v. Hoey doctrine would still
apply.
There is a question whether a portion of the settlement was for the taxes
paid on income earned in 2005 when the Code was changed so that the ESOP
arrangement would not have deferred that year’s income even if the ESOP has been
established correctly. As noted later in this article, if the damage claimed includes
items which had previously been deducted or for which there was not an error, the
amount apportioned to those items will be included in income. A court might
therefore apportion part of the settlement to the 2005 income and treat that portion
as includible in income since there was no overpayment in that year. It is possible,
however, that no apportionment should be made in this case. The accountant knew
that his error did not affect the tax payable for 2005, and so he must have considered
only the tax on the income in 2000 to 2004 in arriving at the settlement. While we
believe that the entire $800,000 ought to be treated as given for the tax paid on the
income earned in 2000 to 2004 and so excluded from income, we acknowledge that
a court might make an apportionment and treat a portion of that amount as
attributable to 2005 and so included in income.
The Lyeth v. Hoey doctrine is good tax policy, and that is likely why it has
been accepted by the courts and the IRS. When two parties at arms’ length arrive
at a settlement, there is good reason for the tax law to accept the result they reached.
It would be inefficient and burdensome to require a party to litigate in a tax case
the issues that were negotiated and resolved with an adverse party. There is no
reason to think that a court would be better able than an adverse party to judge the
merits of a claim. While there likely will be some cases when a court could judge
better, in total the results reached by adverse parties will be at least as reliable.
Administrative convenience and minimizing the burden of proof for taxpayers are
desirable objectives when they can be accomplished without distorting the
9
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operation of the tax system. Moreover, settlements are usually compromises that
reflect the parties estimates of the likelihood of prevailing in litigation. The parties
are in the best position to make those estimates, and there is merit for the tax law
to adhere to them. When litigating with the IRS, parties often settle on a
compromise in which the estimates of likely success are taken into account, and
there is merit to adhering to the compromise that private parties reach in their
settlement.
The Service has taken the position that when the status of the claimant to
prevail is an issue, a settlement will not control whether the claimant actually has
that status. 22 That issue does not arise in McKenney since the status of the taxpayer
in that case was not in dispute. Nevertheless, in our examination in this article of
the Lyeth v Hoey doctrine, we would be remiss not to discuss whether that
distinction is viable. In our view, it is not.
Take for example the facts of the Howard case. One question was whether
the taxpayer in that case was a married woman so that she had dower rights. The
IRS maintained that that question was not resolved by Lyeth v. Hoey because it
related to her status to have dower rights. The Fifth Circuit rightly rejected that
contention and held that the taxpayer’s status is no different from other issues and
is resolved by the settlement. The basis of the Service’s contention is that status of
the taxpayer in the Lyeth v. Hoey case as an heir was not disputed. It is true that
the Supreme Court stated that state law and not federal law determined whether the
taxpayer was an heir. All that that statement meant is that the standards for
determining whether someone is an heir is determined by state law; it did not mean
that a settlement could not establish that those standards were met. A crucial issue
in Lyeth v. Hoey was whether the decedent’s will was valid; the heirs had no right
to the decedent’s property unless the will was invalid and the decedent died
intestate. The validity of a will is determined by state law, not by federal law,
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that the settlement conclusively established
that the taxpayer received the settlement as the heir of an intestate.
III.

THE CLARK DOCTRINE

When a taxpayer’s property is damaged or destroyed, payments received by
the taxpayer to compensate for the loss he suffered are excluded from income to
the extent of the taxpayer’s basis in the damaged property. Consider the following
examples.
Ex. (1). Helen has an adjusted basis of $300,000 in her home.
Helen’s home is damaged by a fire caused by the negligence of
Ralph. As a consequence of the damage caused by the fire, the value
of Helen’s home is reduced by $25,000. Ralph pays Helen $25,000
See TAM 7505140090 and the publication of that advice as a revenue ruling in Rev. Rul. 76-155,
1976-1 Cum. Bull. 286.

22
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to compensate her for the loss he caused. Helen’s receipt of the
$25,000 is treated as a return of the capital she had invested in the
home and so is excluded from income. Helen reduces her basis in
the home to $275,000.
Ex. (2). In Year One, Paula had adjusted gross income of $50,000,
Paula had an automobile with a fair market value of $4,000 that she
had for personal use. Paula had an adjusted basis of $10,000 in the
automobile. In Year One, the automobile was destroyed when a tree
fell on it during a storm. Paula had no other personal casualty losses
or personal casualty gains. While Paula suffered a loss of $4,000
(the lesser of her basis and the car’s fair market value), she would
not be allowed to deduct that loss because a net personal casualty
loss is deductible only to the extent that the loss exceeds 10% of the
taxpayer’s adjusted gross income. Since 10% of Paula’s adjusted
gross income is $5,000, she did not qualify for a deduction.
However, Paula had insured the automobile, and the insurer paid her
$4,000 for her loss. Since the $4,000 she received does not exceed
her adjusted basis in the car, it is excluded from her gross income.
Clark v. Commissioner 23 is the landmark case concerning the tax treatment
of the reimbursement of a taxpayer for the additional amount of tax paid because
of an error of the payor. The facts of Clark are as follows.
In 1932, taxpayer was married and living with his wife. On advice of his tax
counsel, taxpayer and his wife filed a joint federal income tax return for that year.
In 1934, taxpayer was audited by the government who imposed a deficiency for the
taxes paid for 1932. Taxpayer’s tax counsel then realized that if he had advised the
taxpayer and his wife to file separate returns, their tax liability would have been
$19,441.10 less than the amount they actually had to pay. 24 The tax counsel had
advised the parties to file a joint return because of a mistake the tax counsel made
in claiming a deduction to which they were not entitled. Recognizing that his error
caused the taxpayer to pay a larger tax, the tax counsel paid taxpayer $19,441.10 to
compensate him for the excess amount of tax he caused taxpayer to pay. The
government contended that the amount paid to the taxpayer was includible in his
income, and the taxpayer chose to litigate that issue in the Board of Tax Appeals
(now the Tax Court). For convenience, hereafter we will refer to that court as the
Tax Court.
The Tax Court held that the payment to the taxpayer was a return of capital
and so was excluded from his gross income. The tax counsel’s negligence caused
the taxpayer to pay a larger tax than he would have paid if he had been advised
40 BTA 333 (1939), Acq.
The taxpayers were not permitted to file amended separate returns for the year 1932 to cure the
defect.
23
24
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correctly. The tax counsel was liable to taxpayer for the amount of damage he
caused by his negligence. The payment to the taxpayer was compensation for the
extra amount of dollars he paid to the government. Just as a payment for causing
damage to property is treated as return of the capital invested in the property, the
reimbursement of dollars lost is a return of those dollars. Basis in property is just a
reflection of the dollars deemed to be invested in the property, and the damages
received for an injury to property is a replacement of the dollars deemed to be
invested in the property. In the Clark situation, it is the loss of actual dollars that is
being recovered, and that is no different from the recovery of dollars invested in
property.
While the government initially nonacquiesced in the Clark decision, 25 it
subsequently acquiesced 26 in it and published a revenue ruling adopting the Clark
approach. 27 However, the Clark case has been subjected to a significant amount of
discussion by tax experts, some of whom disagree with the result and some of
whom are uneasy with the result. 28 We will discuss the issues raised concerning the
Clark decision and will show that they are without merit.
One issue raised is that the Tax Court in Clark mentioned that the amount
received by the taxpayer was not gain derived from capital or from labor or from
both combined. That language was used by the Supreme Court in its 1920 decision
in Eisner v. Macomber 29 as a definition of what constitutes income for federal
income tax purposes. That definition became the standard used by the courts from
that date until the Supreme Court repudiated it in 1955 in Commissioner v.
Glenshaw Glass. 30 After Glenshaw Glass was decided, that definition was no
longer used. The decision in Clark was criticized for using a definition of income
that was subsequently repudiated. However, the basis of the decision in Clark does
not rest on that defunct definition. Instead, the decision rests on the normal tax
treatment of compensatory damages, and that treatment is as valid today as it was
in 1939. The reference to the Eisner v. Macomber definition was understandable
since it was in good standing at that time, but the decision would be the same if that
definition had been ignored.
There have been three issues raised in questioning the validity of the Clark
decision. We will examine each of them.

1939-2 C.B. 45
1957-1 C.B. 4
27
Rev. Rul. 57-47, 1957-1 Cum. Bul. 23.
28
For a thorough discussion of the principles adopted in the Clark case, see Jeffrey H. Kahn,
Hedging the IRS—A Policy Justification for Excluding Liability and Tax Insurance Proceeds, 26
Yale J. on Reg. 1 (2009) and Lawrence Zelenak, The Taxation of Tax Indemnity Payments: Recovery
of Capital and the Contours of Gross income, 46 Tax L. Rev. 381 (1991).
29
252 U.S. 189 (1920)
30
348 U.S. 426 (1955)
25
26
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(a)

Old Colony Trust

In Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,31 the taxpayer had an
arrangement with his employer under which the employer paid the income tax
liability the taxpayer incurred for the taxes on his salary. Accordingly, the
employer paid the taxpayer’s taxes. The government contended that the payments
of those taxes was additional compensation to the taxpayer and are included in
taxpayer’s gross income. The Supreme Court agreed with the government and held
that the payments were taxable income to the taxpayer. The Court reasoned that the
payment to a third party of a debt of a taxpayer is the same as a payment made
directly to that taxpayer. The Court held that the payment was not a gift but was
additional compensation for taxpayer’s services.
Some tax commentators have contended that the case stands for the
proposition that if someone pays the tax liability of a taxpayer, the payment is
always income to the taxpayer. Since the tax counsel in Clark effectively
reimbursed taxpayer for part of the income tax he paid, that was said to be
equivalent to the counsel’s paying his tax; and the contention was made that
therefore the payment is income to taxpayer under Old Colony. Indeed, the
government relied on Old Colony in asserting that the taxpayer in Clark recognized
income.
That contention reads Old Colony far too broadly. The case does not hold
that any payment of a taxpayer’s tax liability is income to the taxpayer. Rather, it
holds that a payment of a taxpayer’s tax liability (or indeed of any other liability of
the taxpayer) is treated as a payment made directly to the taxpayer and characterized
the same as a direct payment would have been. In its opinion, the Court held that
the payment was not a gift to the taxpayer; thereby inferring that if it had been a
gift, it would not be included in taxpayer’s income. Surely, that is correct. If a father
makes a gift to his son by paying the son’s income taxes, that would not be taxable
income to the son. In Old Colony, the payment of the taxes was made as
compensation for services; and therefore was properly included in the taxpayer’s
income.
Consider the situation where Robert, a consultant to businesses, advises
Alice to incur certain nondeductible expenses that Robert assures her will prove
profitable. Alice incurs the expenses, and they turn out to be of no benefit to her
business at all. Robert acknowledges that he gave bad advice and reimburses Alice
for the expenses she incurred. That reimbursement should be excluded from income
as a return of Alice’s capital. Alice’s situation is identical to the taxpayer in Clark
except that the expenditures in the Clark case were tax payments. There is no reason
why a tax expenditure is different from any other expenditure that was not
deducted.
31

279 U.S. 716 (1929).
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Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) states that another person’s payment of a
taxpayer’s income tax is income to the taxpayer “unless excluded by law.” The
regulation explicitly acknowledges that the payment of a taxpayer’s income tax is
not income to the taxpayer when exclusionary tax principles or provisions are
applicable.
(b)

Annual Accounting.

Another issue that has been raised is whether the Supreme Court’s decision
in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. 32requires the inclusion of the reimbursement in
Clark’s income. The contention is that the annual accounting concept prevents the
examination of past events to characterize the recovery that the taxpayer received
in Clark. The short answer to that question is that the Sanford & Brooks case was
badly decided and clearly would not be decided that way if it arose today. 33 The
case misapplied the annual accounting concept.
In Sanford & Brooks, the taxpayer carried out a contract for the United
States government from the years 1913 to 1915. In conducting that contract, the
taxpayer incurred and deducted expenses that exceeded its income for those years
by $176,271.88. 34 In 1916, taxpayer sued the government for breach of warranty
and obtained a judgment for $192,577.59 compensatory damages that included an
amount for the $176.271.88 of its excess expenses over its income. The taxpayer
also received interest on its award. The Supreme Court held that all of the amounts
received by the tax payer were included in its income. The Court relied on the
annual accounting requirement that income be reported on an annual basis. The
Court stressed that if income instead were reported on a transactional basis, the tax
law would be difficult to administer in that the characterization of current events
could not be made until a transaction was completed perhaps some years in the
future. The case is often cited for the general proposition that income is to be
reported annually, but it is not cited for the holding on the facts that were present
in that case. The annual accounting concept means that a taxpayer cannot take into
account events that occur in the future to characterize the treatment of events in the
current year. It does not mean that events in the past cannot be taken into account
in characterizing current events. There is no administrative difficulty in looking to
the past. It is only the problems that would be caused by having to wait for future
events to occur that is prevented by annual accounting.
It is quite common for the tax law to look at past events to characterize
current events. The use of basis in determining gain or loss or depreciation
deductions is an example of examining past events to characterize what occurs in
the present. The tax benefit rule is another example of referring to past events.
282 U.S. 359 (1931).
See the thorough discussion of that case in Lawrence Zelenak, The Taxation of Tax Indemnity
Payments: Recovery of Capital and the Contours of Gross Income, 46 TAX L. REV 381 (1991).
34
The taxpayer was not able to carryover those losses to a profitable year.
32
33
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Section 108(e)(5) is another example. Section 111(a) excludes from income a
recovery of past expenses that had been deducted without providing a tax benefit.
That provision is a codification of what came to be the common law rule. 35 It is
noteworthy that if the facts of the Sanford & Brooks case arose today, § 111(a)
would exclude the recovery of the prior expenses that were deducted without a tax
benefit.
(c)

Non-parallel Treatment

If no compensation had been obtained in Clark, the taxpayer would not have
been allowed a deduction for the additional tax he paid. 36 Yet, the reimbursement
of that additional tax is excluded from income. We refer to this situation as a nonparallel treatment. Excluding a receipt from income has the same tax consequence
as including it in income and allowing a full deduction for the amount. The apparent
inconsistency in disallowing a deduction for a “loss” while excluding a
reimbursement of that loss from income might seem to violate the principle of
horizontal equity 37 and has troubled some commentators. To the contrary, however,
several commentators 38 have demonstrated that there is no inconsistency in having
non-parallel treatment. In some situations, it would be inappropriate, and in some
it would be correct.
While a non-taxed reimbursement of an expenditure bears some similarity
to allowing a deduction for the expenditure, they are not the same. A reimbursement
provides the taxpayer with the same net worth that he would have had if he had not
made the reimbursed expenditure. Granting a deduction for an unreimbursed
expenditure does not provide the same net worth position for the taxpayer. The
benefit derived from the deduction depends upon the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate;
but regardless of the rate, the benefit will be less than 100% of the expenditure.
While the two situations are not identical, the question remains as to whether
different tax treatments are warranted. As explained below, we conclude that
different treatment is appropriate in some circumstances including the events of the
Clark case.
It is difficult to understand why some commentators have been troubled by
the non-parallel aspect of the Clark situation. There is nothing unusual about that
treatment. There are numerous provisions in the tax law in which that occurs,
especially in the case of a recovery of damages; and it is odd for there to be angst
over the situation when the subject of the reimbursement is tax payments and not
when it is something else. For example, if John is injured by Mildred’s negligence
See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).
§ 275(a)(1).
37
Horizontal equity dictates that people who are in equivalent circumstances should be taxed the
same.
38
See Lawrence Zelenak, n. 33, supra, and Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the
Ethereal Principles of Parallelism and Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645 (2006).
35
36
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and loses his arm as a result of the accident, and if he does not recover damages for
his injury, John is not allowed any deduction for his loss. But, if John recovers
$1,000,000 from Mildred as compensatory damages for his personal physical
injury, the amount he received is excluded from his gross income by § 104(a)(2).
Another example is where property that is held for personal use is damaged
or destroyed. An uncompensated personal casualty loss is deductible only to the
extent that the taxpayer’s net casualty loss exceeds 10% of the taxpayer’s adjusted
gross income. 39 If the casualty loss is less than that floor, none of it is deductible.
However, if the taxpayer is reimbursed for that loss by the tortfeasor or by an
insurance company, the reimbursement is excluded from his income to the extent
of his basis in the property and the payment merely reduces the basis of the
damaged property. In that regard, consider Ex. (2) set forth in Part II of this article.
A similar example is where a taxpayer has medical expenses that do not
exceed the percentage of adjusted gross income floor for that deduction and so are
not deductible. 40 A reimbursement of those expenses by a medical insurer is
excluded from gross income by § 104(a)(3).
In an article written in 1991, Professor Zelenak stated that the question of
whether the reimbursement of a nondeductible expenditure (or the payment of a
taxpayer’s liability the payment of which would not be deductible) should be
excluded from the taxpayer’s income depends upon the reason that Congress made
the expenditure (or the payment of the liability) nondeductible. 41 Professor Zelenak
suggested that if an exclusion from income would contravene the purpose of
denying a deduction, the item should be included in income. If an exclusion from
income does not contravene the purpose of not allowing a deduction, the item can
be excluded from income. Professor Zelenak set forth two examples to illustrate
reimbursements that do not contravene the purpose of nondeductibility, and one of
those examples was the Clark case itself. Those examples are instructive, and we
have set them forth below.
Ex. (3). In year One, Hilda pays a fine of $4,000 to a government.
Hilda is not allowed a deduction for the payment of the fine. Section
162(f) denies a tax deduction for the payment of a fine. In Year
Three, it is determined that Hilda was innocent of the violation, and
the government returned the $4,000 to her. The purpose of
prohibiting a deduction for the payment of a fine is that allowing the
deduction would mitigate the sanction sought to be imposed, and so
no deduction is allowed in order to maintain the level of sanction
chosen for the violation. Returning the fine to the taxpayer when it
§ 165(h)(2).
Currently, the floor is 7.5% of adjusted gross income, but in 2021, the floor is scheduled to return
to 10% of adjusted gross income. § 213(a) and (f).
41
Zelenak, n. 33, supra.
39
40
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is determined that there was no violation does not contravene the
purpose of the nondeductibility provision since there was no reason
to penalize the taxpayer who was innocent.
Ex. (4). Consider the facts of the Clark case. Professor Zelenak gave
the following argument for allowing the exclusion. The reason that
the payment of a federal income tax is not deductible is because
Congress chose to have the income tax be tax-inclusive, and to allow
a deduction would make it tax-exclusive. 42 The exclusion of the
reimbursement does not affect the tax-inclusive characterization of
the amount that taxpayer would have paid if all had been done
properly. The only effect of excluding the reimbursement from
income is to relieve the taxpayer of the burden of an overpayment
of his taxes.
But, the fact is that the taxpayer chose to file a joint return, and consequently
he did owe the larger tax amount to the government. While it is far from clear,
excluding the reimbursement could be deemed to conflict with the goal of having
the entire tax liability be tax-inclusive. If so, can the exclusion still be justified? We
explain below that it can.
While we agree with Professor Zelenak, that if a reimbursement does not
contravene the purposes for which the expenditure was made nondeductible, it can
be excluded from income, we do not agree that contravening the purposes of
nondeductiblity necessarily requires that the reimbursement be included in income.
In the latter circumstance, there can be a separate and independent purpose for
excluding the reimbursement, and the question can then be as to which purpose
should be given priority – the purpose for exclusion or the purpose for denying a
deduction. In some cases, it may well be reasonable to give priority to the purpose
for excluding the reimbursement.
Consider the Clark case as illustrated in Ex. (4) above. The exclusion of the
reimbursement allows the taxpayer to be made whole –i.e., effectively, he bears no
more tax liability than the amount that he would have paid if he had not suffered
from the negligence of the tax counsel. Excluding the compensatory payment from
income facilitates the effort to keep him from suffering harm from the tax counsel’s
negligence. That humane and equitable goal is entitled to considerable weight.
Comparing the goal of eliminating the harm that the taxpayer suffered with the goal
of having a tax-inclusive tax system, it is not unreasonable to give priority to
facilitating the former. Even if the exclusion of the reimbursement were deemed
to conflict with the purpose for nondeductibility, there still is a good reason to
exclude the reimbursement from income.
A tax-inclusive tax is one in which taxes are paid on the income that is used to pay the tax. A taxexclusive tax is one in which tax is not paid on the income that is used to pay the tax,

42

17
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2020
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717227

17

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 181 [2020]

KAHN & KAHN – DRAFT (FORTHCOMING THE TAX LAWYER)
RECOVERY FOR CAUSING TAX OVERPAYMENT

Another objection that has been made to non-parallel treatment is that it
violates horizontal and vertical equity. 43 A number of commentators have made
that point. The nature of the situation and the reason that it is not actually a problem
is illustrated in the following Example.
Ex. (5). A, B, and C are three individuals each of whom has
$100,000 of actual taxable income if their taxable incomes were
determined correctly. All three individuals have their returns
prepared by an accountant. A’s accountant correctly determines his
income, and so A pays tax on $100,000 of taxable income. B’s
accountant negligently errs in determining B’s taxable income, and
so B pays tax on $120,000 of reported income. On discovery of the
error, B’s accountant reimburses B for the additional tax that B paid.
The reimbursement is excluded from B’s gross income.
As a result of that recovery and exclusion, B has the identical increase in
net worth as A whose taxable income was determined properly; and A and B would
pay the same tax. That treatment conforms with horizontal equity. Now assume that
C’s accountant also makes an error, and causes C to pay tax on $120,000 of taxable
income. C’s accountant is judgment proof, and so C does not recover any of the
additional tax he paid. Since C cannot deduct the additional tax he paid as a loss, C
pays a greater tax than either A or B even though all three had the same net income.
That difference of tax treatment would seem to violate the principle of horizontal
equity.
Taxing B on the receipt of damages from the accountant would still result
in a violation of horizontal equity. B would pay a greater tax than A even though
they had the same net income. Indeed, B would have less of an increase in net worth
than A because of the tax B would pay on the receipt of the reimbursement. C would
pay a larger tax than either B or A even though all three had the same net income.
The result is that once a deduction is denied for the excess payment, there
will be a conflict with horizontal and vertical equity regardless of how a
reimbursement is treated by the tax law. Consequently, equity considerations have
no role to play in determining how the reimbursement should be treated.
The reason that there is conflict with horizontal equity in the above situation
is not because of the exclusion of B’s recovery but rather because of the denial of
a deduction to C. Whenever a deduction is denied for a loss, it will create an
inequity in the tax treatment of that taxpayer when compared to the treatment of a
taxpayer who had the same income but did not suffer a loss. For example, F and G
each earned $100,000 net income. G lost $10,000 when it was stolen from him,
For the meaning of horizontal equity, see n. 37, supra. Vertical equity dictates that persons having
disparate amounts of income should pay different amounts of tax that reasonably relate to the
difference in their incomes.

43
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and G could not deduct that loss because of the 10% of adjusted gross income floor.
While G’s increase in net worth is less than F’s, G pays the same amount of tax that
F pays. That is contrary to the vertical equity principle, but it is an inevitable aspect
of denying the deduction. 44
Horizontal and vertical equity are one general goal of the tax law, but there
are many other goals that often take priority over them. Moreover, the
determination of what constitutes a departure from equity is murky at best. 45 The
tax laws are replete with provisions that conflict with horizontal and vertical equity,
and equity principles have been ignored more than followed.
IV.

PURPORTED DISTINCTION OF CLARK

Even if it is agreed that the principle of the Clark case is correct as we have
concluded, the case for the taxpayer in McKenney has another hurdle to overcome.
In Clark, the error make by the tax counsel was the advice he gave about how the
parties should file their tax return. The accountant’s error in McKenney did not
involve the taxpayer’s tax return. Rather, it was the accountant’s failure to take the
required steps to qualify the ESOP so that the taxpayer would obtain the tax deferral
benefits he sought. The question is whether the Clark doctrine applies only to
reimbursements for errors made in preparing or filing the return?
After the IRS came to accept the validity of the Clark decision, it had to rule
on a number of circumstances in which the reimbursement was made for external
errors that failed to qualify the taxpayers for tax relief rather than on the preparation
of a tax return. Initially, the IRS concluded that the Clark doctrine applied in those
situations as well. After a few years, however, the IRS changed its position and
ruled that the doctrine was limited to return errors and did not apply to remedies for
payment of a larger tax because of external errors. The rationale for making that
distinction is that when a return error is made, the taxpayer paid a greater tax than
the correct amount. In contrast, when an external error failed to qualify a taxpayer
for tax relief, the tax that he paid was equal to the tax that he actually owed. Since
the reimbursement of the taxpayer’s larger payment is a reimbursement of a tax that
he actually owed, the IRS maintains that it is included in income under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.61-14(a). As we will show below, we contend that the current position of the
IRS is incorrect and that there is no principled basis for not applying Clark to
external errors. Before discussing the merits of the IRS’s position, we will note
several of the rulings on this issue.
In PLR 8447076, the taxpayer wished to make a gift to his son of the
maximum amount he could give without incurring any gift tax liability. He sought
advice from his attorney as to what that amount would be. The attorney erred in
arriving at a figure that was larger than the minimum amount. Consequently, the
44
45

Id.
See Jeffrey H. Kahn, n. 38, supra.

19
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2020
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3717227

19

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 181 [2020]

KAHN & KAHN – DRAFT (FORTHCOMING THE TAX LAWYER)
RECOVERY FOR CAUSING TAX OVERPAYMENT

taxpayer incurred gift tax liability. Taxpayer claimed that attorney should
reimburse him for the gift tax. A negotiated settlement provided a recovery for
taxpayer. The Service ruled that the payment to taxpayer was excluded from income
under the Clark doctrine.
In a private letter ruling in 1992, the IRS applied the Clark doctrine to
exclude from income an accountant’s reimbursement of a client’s payment of a
larger tax because of the accountant’s failure to qualify the client as a regulated
investment company (RIC). 46 Since, because of the accountant’s error, the client
did not qualify as an RIC, the tax it paid was equal to the tax that it owed. Five
years later, the IRS revoked the 1992 ruling and held instead that the reimbursement
was included in the client’s taxable income. 47
In 1997, the Service ruled on this issue and showed that it had changed its
position. In PLR 9728052, the taxpayer had agreed to pay alimony to his divorced
wife for a period of years with the payments to be made to her estate if she died
with that time frame. Taxpayer agreed to this arrangement on the advice of his
lawyer that the payments would be deductible. The lawyer erred, and the payments
were not deductible thereby causing the taxpayer to pay a larger income tax than
he expected. Taxpayer then entered into negotiations with the attorney for
additional taxes paid, plus interest and penalties incurred. The Service ruled that
any damages he received would be included in his gross income because the error
that the attorney made was external. The Service did not apply Clark because the
amount of tax paid was the amount that was owed.
In 1998, the IRS again ruled on this issue in PLR 9833007. The facts of that
ruling are as follows. After winning a state lottery, a taxpayer consulted an attorney
for advice as to how to treat his winnings. The taxpayer could have reduced his
federal income tax liability for that year by paying his state income tax in the year
in which he received his winnings so that he could deduct that amount from income
that would otherwise be taxed at a high tax rate. If he had done so, the taxpayer’s
federal income tax liability would have been significantly lower. The lawyer failed
to advise the taxpayer to take that step, and so the taxpayer bore a higher tax liability
than he would have if the attorney had not erred. The taxpayer requested a ruling
as to how any recovery he might obtain from the lawyer for his failure to give good
tax advice would be taxed. The recovery he sought would be for the difference
between the amount of federal income tax paid and the amount that would have
been owed if taxpayer had been advised to pay the state tax early. The IRS ruled
that since the taxpayer actually owed the tax he paid, any recovery he received
would be a payment of part of his correct tax liability by a third party and so would
be taxable to him.

46
47

PLR 9211029.
PLR 9743034.
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In our view, the Service’s current position is incorrect. In those rulings and
in McKenney, the advisor’s negligence caused the taxpayer to incur a greater
liability than he would have incurred if the advisor had not erred. The advisor’s
negligence requires him to replace the funds that he caused the client to spend in
order to place the client in the same position that he would have occupied if all had
been done properly. In determining the net amount of additional cost that the client
incurred, the difference in tax liabilities should be offset by any additional costs the
client would have incurred to achieve the reduced tax. Where the advisor’s liability
is settled, as was the case in McKenney, the amount of the settlement at which the
parties arrived will reflect any mitigating costs that reduce the client’s actual loss.
The Service does not dispute that when a person’s negligence causes a
taxpayer to expend more dollars than would have been expended if no error had
been made, the replacement of those dollars is a return of capital and is excluded
from income. That concession is reflected in the Service’s approval of the Clark
decision. But the Service seeks to treat the taxpayer differently when the dollars
that were expended were used to pay federal income taxes. The loss of dollars is
the same to the taxpayer regardless of whether they were expended on taxes or on
some other liability. Consider the following example.
Ex. (6), Mildred has an idea for a profit motivated venture that does
not constitute a trade or business. Consequently, the expenses of
producing income from that venture are miscellaneous itemized
deductions that currently are not deductible. She seeks the advice
of a lawyer as to how best to handle the expenditures to conduct the
venture. The lawyer proposes a plan that will reduce her
expenditures, and she approves it. The lawyer then negligently fails
to implement the plan correctly so that Mildred incurs greater
expenditures than she would have had under the plan. The lawyer
pays Mildred an amount equal to the additional expenditures that his
negligence caused. Because the plan was not implemented correctly,
Mildred did in fact owe the amount of expenditures she paid.
Nevertheless, there is no dispute that the payment Mildred received
is a return of her capital and is excluded from her income. There is
no reason to treat the replacement of those dollars differently when
the expenditure is the payment of a tax. The payment to Mildred is
designed to make her whole from the excess costs she incurred
because of the lawyer’s malpractice. Similarly, in McKenney, the
settlement was designed to make the taxpayer whole from the injury
he suffered from the accountant’s negligence.
The Service seeks to distinguish Clark on the ground that the amount of tax
the taxpayers paid in those other situations was equal to the actual amount of tax
they owed whereas the Service claims that the taxpayer in Clark paid more than his
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actual tax liability. But, that is not true. Clark filed a joint income tax return, and
he was not permitted to change that election. Consequently, Clark did actually owe
the tax that he paid. The payment that he received from the counsel was to replace
the additional tax he actually incurred over what he would have incurred if he had
received proper advice.
The Service’s attempt to treat tax payments differently from other
expenditures is unwarranted. It is true that an error in preparing a tax return is
different factually from an external error. But, there are always factual differences
between a precedent and a new case. For example, the names of the taxpayers can
be different. It is not sufficient to point out a factual difference; it is necessary to
provide a principled justification for treating the parties differently because of that
factual difference. The Service’s claimed justification is that the compensatory
payment effectively is a payment of the taxpayer’s actual tax liability and that is
taxable under Old Colony and Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14. But that ignores why that case
and the regulation characterized a payment of another’s tax as income unless the
law provides otherwise. It was because the payment satisfied a liability of the
taxpayer; it did not matter whether the liability was a tax obligation or some other
obligation. The point of the case and the regulation is that the payment of another
person’s debt is equivalent to making a direct payment to the debtor and should be
treated the same. The Service’s effort to treat a tax debt differently than other debts
makes the tax a kind of shibboleth.
There are several cases in which damages received for paying higher taxes
due to external errors by an advisor have been excluded from income. The courts
did not accept the Service’s contention that the external distinction from the facts
of Clark requires a different result.
In Cosentino v. Commissioner, 48 the Tax Court rejected the claim that an
external error is distinguishable from Clark. In that case, an accountant advised the
taxpayer to adopt a plan for the disposition of realty. The taxpayer carried out the
plan, and it was held to be an abusive tax shelter. The taxpayer incurred a large
amount of tax and interest and penalties. If the taxpayer had known that the plan
was abusive, he would have exchanged the realty for realty of like kind in a § 1031
nonrecognition exchange. Taxpayer sued the accountant, and they settled. The
accountant paid taxpayer $375,000. The settlement did not allocate that amount
among the several losses that the taxpayer claimed. Some of the items claimed by
the taxpayer were expenses that taxpayer had deducted and from which he had
received a tax benefit. One of the items was a claim for a loss in an amount that
was greater than the actual amount of the loss. The court held that the settlement
had to be apportioned among the several items claimed. The amount apportioned
to the payment of higher taxes was excluded from taxpayer’s income. The court
held that the Clark doctrine applied to external errors. The amount apportioned to
48

TC Memo 2014-286 (2014).
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the deducted expenses was included in income under the tax benefit doctrine. The
amount apportioned to the claim for a loss that did not exist was also included in
income.
We discussed Concord Instruments Corp. v. Commissioner 49 in Part II. In
that case, the taxpayer’s lawyer failed to file a timely appeal from an adverse
judgment on a tax issue. The taxpayer sued the lawyer for malpractice claiming
damages for the taxes he paid that would not have been due if he had won the appeal
plus interest that he paid to the IRS and to a bank. Taxpayer had deducted the
interest payments. The suit was settled under which the attorney paid taxpayer
$125,000. The settlement did not apportion the amount among the several claims
that the taxpayer made. The Tax Court held that the settlement had to be
apportioned among the several claims, and the court made that apportionment
according to the percentage of each item in the taxpayer’s complaint. The amount
allocated to the payment of taxes was excluded from taxpayer’s gross income under
the Clark doctrine. The court did not treat an external error differently from a return
error. The amount allocated to interest payments was included in income under the
tax benefit rule.
We have made significant references to an excellent article by Professor
Zelenak on this topic. 50 In that article, Professor Zelenak concluded that the Clark
case was correctly decided. However, he also concluded that the Service’s
distinction between external errors and errors in preparing a tax return is correct. 51
As noted above, we have come to the opposite conclusion. And the several courts
that have passed on that issue have rejected that distinction. In support of his
conclusion, Professor Zelenak set forth an example that he believed demonstrated
that the Service’s distinction is appropriate. At first blush, it might appear that his
example demonstrates that he is correct, but a careful examination shows that he is
not. The substance of his example is set forth below.
Ex. (7). X Corporation issues a bond to Joan for $100. The bond
pays 10% interest ($10 per year). X falsely represents to Joan that
the interest payable on the bond is exempt from federal income tax
under § 103. Upon discovering that she had been misled, Joan
TC Memo 1994-228 (1994). See text accompanying note 21, supra.
See Zelenak, n. 33, supra.
51
Some insurance companies offer a policy to insure a taxpayer that a proposed transaction will
receive the tax treatment the taxpayer wishes. If the transaction is not so treated so that the insurer
is required to pay the taxpayer an amount equal to the additional tax incurred, the question arises
whether those payments by the insurer are taxable to the taxpayer. In a footnote in his 1991 article,
Professor Zelenak states that it is clear that the payment is taxable. Zelenak, n. 33, supra, at 398, n.
81. While that issue is related to the topic of this article, and we disagree with Professor Zelenak’s
statement, we do not choose to discuss it in this article. We note however that one of the authors of
this article has written an article contending that the insurance proceeds are not taxable. See Jeffrey
H. Kahn, Hedging the IRS – A Policy Justification for Excluding Liability and Tax Insurance
Proceeds, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2009).
49
50
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complains, and X is required to pay Joan the amount necessary to
put her in the same position she would occupy if the bond’s interest
were tax exempt. Assume that Joan is in the 20% marginal tax
bracket. So, the tax on the $10 of interest she receives each year
would be $2, and Joan would retain $8 per year after tax. X will pay
Joan an amount each year to provide her with $10. If the payment
made to Joan is excluded from income, X will pay her $2 each year.
If, however, the payment to Joan is subject to tax (at a 20% marginal
rate). X will have to pay her $2.50 for her to have $10 after tax. In
effect, if the payment to Joan is not taxable, X can be seen as paying
interest at a 12% rate, but if it is taxable, X will be paying interest at
a 12.5% rate. The result is that X would have had to pay Joan 12.5%
interest to give her the promised 10% after-tax return, but if the
compensatory payment is excluded form income, X will have to pay
only 12% interest.
We should note that the problem raised by the example does not exist in the
McKenney case. First, in the example, there was not an error that prevented Joan
from having a desired tax benefit that she would have enjoyed if the error had not
been made as was the case in McKenny. Joan would not have been entitled to tax
exempt interest in any event. Joan’s complaint is that she was misled as to what the
tax consequences of her arrangement would be, not that she was prevented by
negligence from obtaining those benefits. Second, the compensatory payment in
McKenny was not made by the obligor of the debt in question so it did not affect
the arrangement between the debtor (the taxpayer) and the obligor (the
government). Thirdly, there is no risk of collusion or fraud in McKenney since
neither party benefitted from the error.
The accountant’s payment in McKenney did not reduce the revenue the
government received from taxpayer for the income the taxpayer earned on the bond.
If, as we maintain, the accountant’s payment is excluded from income, the
government will not collect any additional revenue from that payment. The reason
is that the government has chosen generally not to tax compensatory payments.
Congress could tax compensatory payments if it chose to do so, but it has not. There
is nothing unusual about not taxing the compensatory payments that were made in
McKenny or in similar cases.
As to the factual situation posed in Ex. (7), the payments made by X to Joan
are not actually interest payments. They are compensation for an injury she
suffered, and the amount of her injury is measured by the amount of tax she
incurred. Instead of the proposed characterization of the payments as additional
interest on the bond, they might better be characterized as a reduction of Joan’s cost
in purchasing the bond. As such, they would reduce her basis in the bond. In that
regard, consider the comparable treatment of a cancellation of a debt in § 108(e)(5),
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which is a codification of the common law treatment of such cancellations. If a
purchase money debt is cancelled in what would normally be treated as income to
the debtor, instead it is treated as a reduction of the cost of the purchased item.
In any event, as noted above, the principal concerns that Professor Zelenak
has are the possibility of collusion and the obtaining of unauthorized tax treatment
by arranging for compensatory payments to be made. As noted above, there is no
prospect for collusion in the McKenney situation or in comparable cases. Even in
the situation described in the Example, the requirement that the arrangement be
bona fide and that a settlement be bona fide, in good faith and having the color of
merit would seem to be sufficient to prevent an abuse.
V.

Allocation

If a claim for damages for malpractice includes a claim for expenses
incurred in addition to a claim for compensation for payment of higher taxes, and
if the claims are settled by payment of a lump sum amount which is not apportioned
in the settlement agreement, the courts will apportion the settlement amount among
the several claimed items. There is no established manner for making that
allocation, but typically the courts and the Service have allocated according to the
percentage each item represents in the complaint or claim.
If a settlement includes an allocation, the courts generally will accept it if
the “agreement is entered into by the parties in an adversarial context at arm’s
length and in good faith.” 52 It is surprising that so many settlements fail to make an
apportionment.
VI.

Conclusion

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit in McKenny failed to take into account
the Lyeth v. Hoey doctrine that a bona fide, arm’s length settlement is conclusive of
the matters settled by that agreement. The court’s decision for the government
rested on its determination that the taxpayer failed to provide proof of items that
were settled in the written agreement between the taxpayer and the accountant. We
have shown that the Lyeth v. Hoey doctrine does apply to the case and should have
been treated as conclusive of those issues.
Because the court determined that the taxpayer had failed to prove crucial
elements of the case, the court expressly declined to examine the question of
whether a payment to compensate a taxpayer for paying a larger tax because of an
external error of the payor should be excluded from income. This issue raises the
questions of whether the Tax Court’s decision in Clark is valid and, if so, as to the
scope of that doctrine. We have examined the Clark doctrine in the light of
objections raised by some commentators and found that the doctrine is valid. We
52

Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994), aff’d on that issue, 70 F.3d 34 (5th Cir. 1995).
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have discussed the issues of whether the Old Colony and the Sanford & Brooks
cases invalidate the Clark doctrine and concluded that they do not. We examined
the issue as to whether non-parallel treatment violates horizontal and vertical equity
principles and shown that equity cannot be obtained in the Clark situation because
no matter whether the compensatory payment is excluded or taxed, there will be a
conflict with horizontal or vertical equity. Consequently, the principle of horizontal
and vertical equity has no role to play in determining how to treat those
compensatory payments.
While the Service has accepted the validity of the Clark decision, it
maintains that it is limited to errors made concerning the preparation of a tax return
and does not apply to external errors that caused a taxpayer to incur a larger tax
obligation. We have shown that there is no justification for treating compensatory
payments to an injured party because of external errors differently from
compensatory payments for errors in preparing a tax return. The purpose of
generally not taxing compensatory payments is to facilitate the making whole of an
injured party, and the injury caused by increasing a victim’s tax liability is as
harmful as any other pecuniary injury and should be treated the same.
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